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NOTES
THE MISGUIDED APPLICATION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT TO COLLEGES AND
UNIVERSITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF
SHARING FINANCIAL AID INFORMATION
The combination of an economic recession and high tuition
rates at American colleges and universities has focused the attention
of many high school students on financial aid.' For many of these
students, a college education would be unaffordable without the
packages of grants, loans and campus work opportunities that fi-
nancial aid makes available. 2 In 1989, however, the United States
Department of Justice revealed that it was investigating the possi-
bility that several private colleges and universities had colluded to
fix tuition prices and minimize financial aid awards. 3 On May 22,
1991, the Justice Department entered into a consent decree with
the eight Ivy League colleges under which the schools agreed to
disband the "Overlap Group," an association of colleges that had
' See David P. Kreisler, The Antitrust Laws and the Overlap Group: Were Colleges and Univer-
sities the Robber Barons of the 1980s?, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 217, 217 (1991); Eric Scheske,
Financial Aid and Antitrust: Financial-Aid Packages Subject ofJustice Department Probe, 17 J.C. &
U.L. 43, 43 (1990); Anthony Flint, Tuition Hikes at Record Low: Spurred by.Recession, Smaller
Student Pools, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 33.
2 See Scheske, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing need for aid); Memorandum from Robert
K. Durkee, Vice President for Public Affairs, Princeton University, and Peter Berek, Special
Assistant to the President and Professor of English, Williams College 4 ( Jan. 3, 1990) (on
file with the Boston College Law Review) (describing financial aid packages).
3 See Erika B. Smith, Are Schools Violating the Sherman Act by Collaborating on Financial Aid
Packages?, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 653, 653 (1990); Paul M. Barrett & Christopher J. Chipello, U.S.
Investigates Prestigious Universities, Colleges for Possible Antitrust Violations, WALL. ST . J., Aug. 10,
1989, at B2.
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met each spring since 1954. to exchange financial aid information
about students accepted at more than one of the member schools. 4
The consent decree was filed simultaneously with the federal gov-
ernment's civil lawsuit against the Ivy League schools and the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT"). 5 The lawsuit alleges
that the practice of meeting and sharing financial aid information
constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. 8 MIT did not participate
in the settlement and is currently awaiting trial. 7
By the terms of the consent decree, the schools discontinued
their practice of exchanging information but denied any wrong-
doings For the Ivy League schools, the consent decree was the
culmination -of a two-year investigation by the Justice Department
into the mechanisms by which the schools . set their financial aid
awards. 9 As part of the consent decreë, the goverrinient agreed to
drop the :lawsuit.t° In addition, the Justice Department notified
twenty7five of the. fifty-five colleges and universities originally tar-
geted for inquiry that they were no longer under investigation."
United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at I (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1991)
(order 'approving consent decree); Barrett' & Chipello, supra note 3, at 82 (definition of
"Oveilap Grote); John W. Mashek &Anthony Flint, Ivy Colleges Settle Price-fixing Charges;
BOSTON GLOBE,. May 23, 1991,. at 1 (discussion of consent decree). The eight Ivy League
schools are Brown University, Columbia•University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College,
Harvard University, PrinCeton University, the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University.
Mashek & Flint, supra, at 38. The other members of the Overlap Croup were Amherst
College, Barnard College, Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr College, Colby College, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology ("MIT"), Middlebury College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith
College, Trinity College, Tufts University, Vassar College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan Uni-
versity and Williams College. Cary Putka, Colleges Cancel Aid Meetings Under Scrutiny, WALL
Sr. J., Mar. 12, 1991,.at B5..A "consent decree" is an immediate settlement initiated by the
target of an investigation under which the alleged wrongdoer ceases the questioned practice
in exchange for the government's dismissal of the lawsuit. LAWRENCE ANTHONY SU4t.IVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LA:w OF ANTITRUST § 243(b), at 758 (1977).
3 Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at 1 (order approving consent decree); Mashek & Flint,
supra note 4, at 38.
6 Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C. l2 1, Sherman
Antitrust Act at I, 7-8, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May
22, 1991). The Sherman Act states in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1989).
Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38.
Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at 4-5 (order approving consent decree).
9 Anthony DePalma, Amid Inquiry, Ivy League To Stop Sharing Aid Data, N .Y . TIMES, May
23, 1991, at Al2„ The Justice Department also investigated the processes by which the schools
set tuition prices and faculty salaries. Understanding" the Antitrust Investigation, AGB REP.: J.
Ass'N GOVERNING BOARDS . U. & C., Man-Apr. 1990, at 18-19.
19
 Brown Univ., No. 91—CI V-3274 at 1-2 (order approving consent decree); Mashek &
Flint, supra note 4, at 38. -
1 ' Scott Jaschik, Six More Colleges Told They No L'Onger Face Federal Antitrust Investigations,
July 1992].
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Thus, twenty-three schools remain under investigation, the majority
of which are Overlap Group members.' 2
According to the Justice Department, the sharing of students'
financial information constituted a conspiracy to set financial aid
awards at a fixed level for any given applicant, thereby depriving
students of the benefits of price competition.' 3 The schools count-
ered that their goal was not to deprive students of financial aid but
to apportion the limited funds available among the applicants in
such a way that the maximum number of students would benefit."
To do otherwise, they argued, would result in a "bidding war"
scenario that would divert resources from the truly needy by con-
centrating them on a few highly qualified students. 15 This height-
ened competition would require increased revenues to fund; more-
over, it would contradict congressional policy espoused in the
federal laws that control aid level determinations for the federal
grants and loans that schools provide to students. 16 The ultimate
CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Feb. 5, 1992, at A34; see also Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38.
Although the Justice Department did not publish the names of the schools it targeted, the
schools outside the Ivy League which have since acknowledged being under investigation are
Agnes Scott College, Albion College, Amherst College, Antioch University, Barnard College,
Bates College, Bennington College, Bowdoin College, Bryn Mawr College, Chatham College,
Colby College, the College of Wooster, Connecticut College, Converse College, Denison
University, DePauw University, Earlham College, Goucher College, HaMilton College, Hollins
College, Hope College, Johns Hopkins University, Kalamazoo College, Kenyon College, Mary
Baldwin College, MIT, Middlebury College, Mount Holyoke College, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Oberlin College, Ohio Wesleyan University, Randolph-Macon Woman's College, Sarah
Lawrence College, Skidmore College, Smith College, Stanford University, Sweet Briar Col-
lege, Trinity College, Tufts University, the University of Chicago, the University of Rochester,
the University of Southern California, Vassar College, Wabash College, Wellesley College,
Wells College, Wesleyan University, Wheaton College and Williams College. Jaschik, supra,
at A34. . •
12 See Jaschik, supra note 11, at A34. The schools still under investigation that were not
Overlap Group members are Agnes Scott College, Bates College, Connecticut College, Ham-
ilton College, Johns Hopkins University, Northwestern University, Stanford University, the
University of Chicago and the University of Rochester. Id.
" Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C. 4 1, Sherman
Antitrust Act at 6, 7-9, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May
22, 1991).
"See Francis Oakley, The Antitrust Inquiry and Higher Education, WILLIAMS REP., Oct.
1989, at 4; Timothy H. Goldsmith, Antitrust Laws Shouldn't Apply to College Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1991, at 22.
13 Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38 (bidding war); see also Oakley, supra note 14, at 5
(diverting resources).
16 Oakley, supra note 14, at 4-5 (funding issues and federal policy); DePalma, supra note
9, at Al2 (funding issues); see also Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. 44 1087dd(b)(1),
1091(b) (1989). Colleges and universities refer to these laws as the "congressional method-
ology." Oakley, supra note 14, at 4.
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effect of requiring colleges and universities to compete for students
on this level, the schools argued, would likely be higher tuition
prices for all students.' 7 Tuition increases would be necessary to
meet the added costs of using financial aid packages, based on
criteria other than need, to bid for the top echelon of students.' 8
Roger Kingsepp, a student at Wesleyan University, com-
pounded the issues presented by the Justice Department's investi-
gation when he filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all students
against Wesleyan and eleven other colleges.° Characterizing stu-
dents as consumers of a higher education product, Kingsepp alleged
that the schools conspired to fix financial aid awards. 2° The Kingsepp
case is currently awaiting trial in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. 2 ' Thus, two civil suits remain
in federal district court which are likely to affect the legality of this
type of information-sharing: the Kingsepp case and the government's
suit against MIT. 22
This note examines, in the context of the Sherman Act and
federal policy prohibiting anticompetitive _activity, the practice of
sharing financial data that colleges and universities have acquired
regarding students accepted at more than one school. Section I
analyzes the judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act as it applies
to nonprofit entities." This section also discusses the legal frame-
work that the Supreme Court has established to analyze alleged
violations of the Sherman Act. 24 Section II examines the history
and current status of the Justice Department's investigation, focus-
ing on the investigative techniques employed, the formation and
purpose of the Overlap Group, the consent decree and the position
of those schools that remain as defendants in either the government
L7 See Barbara Vobejda, Antitrust Division Probing Top Colleges' Tuition and Aid, WASH.
POST, Aug. 9, 1989, at A3.
LB See a
See Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., No. 89—C1V-6121
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 15, 1989). The other colleges named in the lawsuit are Amherst College,
Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard
University, Princeton University, Stanford University, the University of Pennsylvania, Wil-
liams College and Yale University. Id.
" Id. at 3. Kingsepp also alleged a conspiracy to fix tuition prices. Id.
21 See Putka, supra note 4, at B5.	 .
" See Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C. 11 1, Sherman
Antitrust Act at 1, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22,
1991); Plaintiff's Complaint at 1; Kingsepp, No. 89—CIV-6121.
BB See infra notes 28-132 and accompanying, text.
" See infra notes 28-132 and accompanying text.
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action or the, private lawsuit. 25 Section III applies the Court's sta-
tutory constructs to the activities of the Overlap Group, concluding
that, despite the Ivy League schools' agreement to refrain from
sharing financial aid information in the future, the practice of doing
so does not violate the Sherman Act. 26 Section IV- discusses the
possibility of legislative intervention on behalf of the schools in their
effort to provide financial aid in the most equitable and efficient
manner. 27 This section also analyzes the conflicting policy consid-
erations underlying this issue. Finally, this section concludes that
such information exchanges have socially beneficial effects and pro-
poses that Congress address the issue by amending federal law to
exempt the sharing of financial aid information from Sherman Act
application, thereby furthering national education policy.
I. THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW
A. Entities Subject to Sherman Act Application
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act, which prohibited
the anticompetitive practice of restraining interstate trade in the
United States. 28 This nineteenth century legislation reflected the
country's procompetitive posture. 29 Nevertheless, the law was writ-
ten in broad language and did not define certain terms, including
"combination," "restraint of trade" or "commerce." 3° Therefore; the
statute required judicial interpretation to clarify its meaning." The
Supreme Court has interpreted section one of the Sherman Act to
prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints of trade, but the statute does
not distinguish explicitly among the types of activities to whiCh it
applies." A line of Supreme Court cases, however, has determined
which of these activities are within the scope of the statute."
23 See infra notes 133-85 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
29 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1989). See supra note 6 for the text of section 1.
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (nineteenth century); EARL W. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
§ 4.1, at 125-26 (1980); Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and Tuition Price-fixing: An
Antitrust Primer, 17 J.C. Sc U.L. 271, 274 (1991) (procompetitive posture).
3° KINTNER, supra note 29, § 4.18, at 239; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1.
21 KINTNER, supra note 29, 4.18, at 239.
32 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (court
interpretation); see also 15 U.S.C. I (terms undefined).
" See generally Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780, 793 (1975) (professional
organization of lawyers subject to Sherman Act); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
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In 1940, the United States Supreme Court held in Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader that the Sherman Act did not apply to the actions of
strikers in a labor dispute that prevented the employer from pro-
ducing its goods. 34 The Apex Hosiery Court reasoned that by taking
over the employer's factory for several weeks, the strikers did not
intend to restrain competition for the employer's product, but
merely intended to compel the employer to agree to the union's
demands." Therefore, the employees' self-imposed restraint on the
sale of their services to the employer did not fall within the ambit
of the Sherman Act and was not prohibited.36
The Apex Hosiery Court, stating that it lacked guidance else-
where, reasoned that it was appropriate to interpret consistently the
Sherman Act, its legislative history and the problems that gave rise
to its enactment." Justice Stone, writing for the majority, observed
that the Sherman Act was passed in the day of "trusts" and "com-
binations" of businesses and capital that were organized for the
purpose of controlling markets through monopolistic practices."
The Court noted that the Sherman Act sought to prevent the re-
straint of free competition in commercial transactions that would
affect production, prices or otherwise control the market." After
examining the congressional debates prior to the bill's passage, the
Apex Hosiery Court noted that "business competition," rather than
individual labor disputes, was the issue under consideration by Con-
gress and that the statute was intended to proscribe restraints of
trade affecting "business competition."4°
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia followed the Apex Hosiery interpretation of the Sherman Act's
scope in 1970 in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.'" In Middle States, the
court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to a college accre-
ditation association that refused to accredit institutions operating as
512 (1940) (strikers in a labor dispute not subject to Sherman Act); Marjorie Webster Junior
College, Inc. v. Middle States Assn of Colleges and Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650,
653-54, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (association of institutions of higher education not subject to
Sherman Act), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
" 310 U.S. at 512.
35 Id. at 501-02.
35 Id.
"Id. at 489.
"Id. at 480, 491-93.
"Id. at 493.
10 Id. at 493 n.15.
432 F.2d 650, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
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profit-making organizations. 42 The court reasoned that because ac-
creditation is not within the "sphere of commerce," Congress did
not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to it." In broader terms,
the court also held that the proscriptions of the Sherman Act do
not apply to the "noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the
learned professions."44
In 1975, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, questioned the validity of the view that certain
organizations are beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. 45 In Gold-
farb, the Court held that the Sherman Act applied to prohibit a
minimum fee schedule propounded by the state bar for title ex-
amining services performed by its member attorneys. 46 The Goldfarb
Court reasoned that the Sherman Act applied because lawyers play
a role in commercial transactions, including title work in real estate
financing. 47 Although the fee schedule was only advisory, none of
the lawyers who responded to the plaintiff homebuyers' inquiries
charged a lower fee and a state bar regulation provided that lawyers
habitually charging below the schedule could be disciplined." The
Court concluded that such anticompetitive activities act as a restraint
on commerce.49
Given the commercial nature of the attorneys' work in Goldfarb,
the Court noted that a public service aspect to a profession such as
lawyering does not exempt it from the Sherman Act. 5° Moreover,
the Court generally stated that the nature of any occupation, by
itself, will not exempt that occupation from Sherman Act applica-
tion.51 Therefore, one commentator has noted that the effect of the
Goldfarb decision was to retreat from the Apex Hosiery view of the
Sherman Act by broadening the statute's scope of inquiry to include
Id. at 652, 654-55.
43 Id. at 655. The court did note that if a commercial motive could be attributed to a
refusal of accreditation, antitrust law would presumably apply. Id. at 654-55, The court
hypothesized a scenario where accreditation was denied a school that purchased textbooks
from a supplier who had not agreed to provide discounts to members of the accreditation
association. Id. at 655 n.21. The court suggested that this would qualify as a commercial
motive. Id.
44 Id. at 654.
45 421 U.S. 773, 792-93 (1975).
/d. at 775, 776, 793.
47 Id. at 787-88.
48 Id. at 781, 782-83.
49 Id. at 787-88.
Id. at 787.
31 Id.
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business activities, professional services and, presumably, nonprofit
organizations. 52
B. Legal Framework for Statutory Analysis
The Supreme Court historically has judged alleged violations
of the Sherman Act by one of two analytical methodologies: the per
se rule or the rule of reason. 53 These statutory tests developed
concurrently, with allegations of blatant horizontal price-fixing
being analyzed using a per se analysis while other, less obvious
allegations are analyzed using the rule of reason standard." Per se
rule application results in the condemnation of the challenged ac-
tivity based upon the conclusive presumption that the activity con-
stitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. 55 A court making such
an evaluation does not inquire into the purpose of the restraint or
justifications for it." A rule of reason analysis, in contrast, does
inquire into the reasonableness of the challenged activity to deter-
mine whether a violation exists. 57 The Court has recently merged
the two tests into a third test, the "NCAA approach," to be used
when application of the per se rule appears necessary but the hor-
izontal restraints on the market in question are deemed essential to
the product's availability. 58 This development arose as a result of
the Court's unwillingness merely to apply formalistic labels to al-
leged price-fixing arrangements." The following discussion will an-
32 See Richmond, supra note 29, at 276-77; see also KINTNER, supra note 29, $ 10.5, at
100.
33 KINTNER, supra note 29, § 8.3, at 362-63.
54 /d. at 368-69. Horizontal price-fixing refers to price-setting arrangements among
similarly situated entities that compete to distribute goods and services. Id. 10.3, at 74. A
vertical arrangement would occur along one chain of distribution; that is, an arrangement
among a manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer. See id. 12.16, at 394-95. The practices of
the Overlap Group, the Justice Department has argued, fall into the category of horizontal
price-fixing because the sharing of financial information leads to standardized awards of
financial aid from independent colleges competing to sell higher education to overlapping
pools of students. See Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, Sherman Antitrust Act at 4, 6, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D.
Pa. filed May 22, 1991).
KthrrwEit, supra note 29, § 8.3, at 362-63.
56
 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982).
57 /d. at 343.
35 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984)
(continued availability of a college football "product" was doubtful absent control of all
television contracts by the National Collegiate Athletic Association); KINTNER, supra note 29,
§ 8.3, at 32 (Supp. 1992).
39 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (suggesting that courts must
achieve a certain level of familiarity with a given business to be competent to make per se
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alyze the development and application of the per se rule, the rule
of reason and the NCAA approach.
In 1927, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that the defendant companies, which con-
trolled eighty-two percent of the American vitreous pottery market
and had combined to fix prices and limit sales, had violated the
Sherman Act. 6° In the case, the Court reasoned that the inherent
purpose of a price-fixing agreement is to eliminate price competi-
tion. 61 The Court observed that implicit in the power to fix a price
is the power to control a market.62 Even reasonable prices set by
responsible actors, the Court continued, have the potential to be-
come unreasonable over time as a result of changed market con-
ditions.63 Should that happen, the price is unlikely to be altered
because the lack of competition affords no incentive to make a price
adjustment." Therefore,. the Court noted, even reasonable price-
fixing agreements automatically may be held to be unreasonable
restraints of trade, and "minute 'inquiry" into the reasonableness of
particular prices is unnecessary. 65 Although the Trenton Potteries
Court did not use the phrase "per se" to describe its approach to
evaluating such price-fixing arrangements, one commentator has
noted that the reasoning supported later per se decisions. 66
In 1940, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the Court
confirmed its adherence to the per se approach by holding that a
combination of oil companies that had established buying programs
for distress gasoline had violated the Sherman Act.67 In Socony-
Vacuum, the Court considered whether the defendant companies'
attempts to raise and maintain spot market prices by eliminating
from competition the cheaper distress gasoline were an illegal re-
straint of trade." The Court reasoned that such an arrangement
evaluations); KINTNER, supra note 29, § 8.3, at 36 (Supp. 1992); Richmond, supra note 29, at
281.
66 273 U.S. 392, 394, 402 (1927).
Al Id. at 397.
" Id.
65 Id.
64 See id.
" Id. at 397-98.
" See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 213-14 (1940) (citing
Trenton Potteries for the proposition that reasonably set prices do not compel a finding of a
reasonable restraint of trade); KINTNER, supra note 29, 8.3, at 366; Richmond, supra note
29, at 282.
67 310 U.S. at 155, 216, 228. "Distress gasoline" is gasoline produced in such abundance
that it cannot be stored and must be sold immediately, usually at a low price. Id. at 17 . 1.
68 Id. at 216.
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violated the Sherman Act because any combination formed with the
purpose of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal
per se."69 Moreover, the Court noted that under this analysis, proof
of prior competitive abuses in an attempt to demonstrate beneficial,
procompetitive effects is irrelevant."
The Court applied the per se rule again in the 1982 case of
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, which held that agree-
ments among competing doctors setting maximum fees for certain
services covered by specific insurance plans violate the Sherman
Act.7 ' Although the idea of a maximum price as opposed to a
minimum price carried with it a connotation of social utility, the
Court refused in its analysis to consider potential policy justifications
other than to note that the price-fixing arrangements at issue were
not "premised on public service or ethical norms." 72 The Court also
rejected the argument that the physicians' agreement to set maxi-
mum fees had procompetitive aspects, reasoning that the anticom-
petitive potential and unlikelihood of significantly enhanced com-
petition justified application of the per se rule. 73 The Court
therefore held that the arrangement was illegal per se. 74 Addressing
the policy issue, however, the Court observed that clear, unambig-
uous interpretations of the law enhance the likelihood that Congress
will choose to intervene by amending a statute if it determines that
a court has misinterpreted legislation. 75 It therefore noted that the
medical society was free to direct its argument to Congress."
" Id. at 223.
" Id. at 218. For the majority, Justice Douglas wrote:
Ruinous competition, financial disaster, evils of price-cutting and the like appear
throughout our history as ostensible justifications for price-fixing. If the so-
called competitive abuses were to be appraised here, the reasonableness of prices
would necessarily become an issue in every price-fixing case. In that event, the
Sherman Act would soon be emasculated; its philosophy would be supplanted
by one which is wholly alien to a system of free competition; it would not be
the charter of freedom which its framers intended.
Id. at 221.
" 457 U.S. 332,335-36,357 (1982).
72 See id. at 349.
73 Id. at 351.
74 See id. at 357.
74 Id. at 354-55. Congress has exempted several types of business activities from Sherman
Act application. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1 17 (1989) (labor organizations); Webb-Pomerene Act,
15 U.S.C. 1 62 (1989) (export trade associations); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
1012(b) (1989) (state law supersedes Sherman Act with respect to insurance).
76 Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 354-55.
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One commentator contends that the per se rule is, in effect, an
effort to achieve judicial economy. 77 To that extent, it is typically
applied whenever it appears that a meaningful inquiry into the
reasonableness of an alleged price-fixing arrangement will be too
complicated, costly or unlikely to uncover useful facts. 78 Neverthe-
less, judicial concern for market efficiency and consumer well-being,
the commentator notes, has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
obtain per se evaluations. 79
 This is because the per se rule's admin-
istrative efficiency may come at the expense of potential consumer
benefits that only a more thorough inquiry could reveal." There-
fore, the per se rule is often abandoned in favor of the rule of
reason standard when the questioned activity results in beneficial
effects.81
During the same period that the Supreme Court developed the
per se rule, it developed the rule of reason standard. 82 In the 1911
case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court discussed the rule of reason, holding that the monopolistic
practices of John Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company violated the
Sherman Act." The Court concluded that Standard Oil had violated
the Sherman Act because it had acquired a monopoly over Ameri-
can oil in both its crude and refined states. 84 The Court reasoned
that Congress intended the Sherman Act to make unlawful those
anticompetitive conditions and enhancements of prices that were
unreasonably restrictive. 85 The Court noted, however, that certain
contracts or combinations could be formed with the legitimate pur-
pose of reasonably pursuing business profits, and that the crux of
the matter was the reasonableness of the pursuit." The Court noted,
therefore, that because the question is not whether a challenged
" See KINTNER, supra note 29, § 8.3, at 363 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
78 See id. f 8.3, at 367.
" See id. 8.3, at 363, 369-70.
B° See id. § 8.3, at 369-70.
81 See id.; National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01
(1984) (per se rule inapplicable because horizontal market restraints were necessary to con-
tinued availability of product); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (per
se rule inapplicable because licensing arrangements were premised on considerations of
practicality and economic efficiency).
82 See generally Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8; Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
13' See 221 U.S. 1, 66, 77 (1911).
"Id. at 77.
" Id. at 58.
8'8 Id.
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activity is a restraint of trade, but whether it is an unreasonable
restraint of trade within the scope of the Sherman Act, the rule of
reason is the appropriate standard to apply. 87
 Moreover, the court
will judge the reasonableness of the challenged activity based upon
public policy and the activity's competitive effects. 88
In 1918, in Board of Trade v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that a rule established by the Chicago Board of Trade which
set the price of a portion of the grain contracts traded when the
Board was not open, did not violate the Sherman Act. 89 The Court
reasoned that the established rule was not a violation because it
affected only a small portion of the grain shipped to Chicago, it did
not affect market prices in general and it resulted in several bene-
ficial, procompetitive market effects. 9° Justice Brandeis, writing the
unanimous opinion, noted that all agreements addressing trade
issues restrain or regulate trade to some extent. 9 ' The important
question, according to the Court, is whether such restraint is anti-
competitive or whether its regulatory effects are actually procom-
pe titive . 92
The Supreme Court again applied the rule of reason standard
in the 1979 case of Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. and held that licensing rights granted to Broadcast
Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the American Society of Composers, Au-
thors and Publishers ("ASCAP") did not constitute an anticompe-
titive practice in violation of the Sherman Act." In Broadcast Music,
the owners of copyrighted music granted to BMI and ASCAP the
right to charge blanket percentages of revenues or flat dollar fees
for use of their music. 94
 The Court observed that the large number
of users, the monitoring difficulties and the general impracticability
in the music industry of negotiating each work on an individual
' 87 Id. at 66.
"Id.
"246 U.S. 231, 237, 241 (1918).
9° See id. at 240-41.
g' Id. at 238.
82 Id. Justice Brandeis also noted the factors relevant to this consideration:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed;
the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id.
" 441 U.S. 1, 5, 24-25 (1979).
Id. at 5.
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basis created "unique market conditions" such that the blanket li-
cense system was not unreasonable." The Court noted that deter-
mining whether the challenged activity would restrict competition
and hamper productivity, or whether it would stimulate the market
through increased competition, was of primary importance in this
inquiry.'"'
One component of the Broadcast Music Court's analysis involved
the similarity of the challenged activity to a provision of the Copy-
right Act. 97 The Copyright Act adopted a similar blanket licensing
system for cable television transmission." The Court analogized the
Copyright Act to the practices of BMI and ASCAP, observing that
the latter may have been conducting economically beneficial activi-
ties. 99 The Court thus established that economic considerations and
other federal law are relevant factors in determining whether an
activity should be upheld using the rule of reason.")
One commentator has noted that by 1984, the Supreme Court's
dual approach to antitrust cases had grown somewhat confusing.'°'
Justice White stated in Broadcast Music that absent the "plainly an-
ticompetitive" nature of a challenged activity, and a court's "consid-
erable experience" with the activity, the court should not apply the
per se rule but should defer to the rule of reason standard. 10" The
Broadcast Music Court further noted that market efficiency and
procompetitive aspects of the activity were crucial factors in making
a rule of reason determination.'" In Maricopa County, however, the
Court was presented with a situation where a group of physicians
set a maximum fee as part of a physicians' medical society, thus
benefiting patients through lower insurance premiums.'" Never-
theless, Justice Stevens, who had dissented in Broadcast Music, stated
in the majority opinion in Maricopa County that certain cases are not
important enough for courts to waste time determining whether
95 See id. at 14-15, 24 (citing in part Memorandum for United States as Amicus Curiae on
Pet. for Cert. at 10, K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147).
" Id. at 19-20.
" See id. at 15 (citing 17 U.S.C. app. § 111(d)(5)(A)).
" Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. app. § 111(d)(5)(A)).
99 Id. at 15-16.
See id.
101 See Richmond, supra note 29, at 288.
192 See 441 U.S. at 7-8, 9.
103 See id. at 19 n.33, 19-20.
irm Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 351-52, 357 (1982) (holding
that the fee arrangement "fit squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold" and was a
violation of the Sherman Act).
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procompetitive aspects outweigh anticompetitive aspects and there-
fore such cases warrant per se rule application. 1 °3
Justice Powell, dissenting in Maricopa County, noted that the
Court had not cited any cases in which similar situations had been
evaluated under the per se rule. 1 °8 He further stated that the price-
setting arrangement undertaken by the medical society was not
plainly anticompetitive, and that therefore the per se rule ought
not to apply. i°7 According to one commentator, therefore, Broadcast
Music and Maricopa County represent contrary interpretations of the
standard under which alleged violations of the Sherman Act ought
to be analyzed.'°8
The Supreme Court then held in 1984, in National Collegiate
Athletic Association v, Board of Regents, that a National Collegiate
Athletic Association ("NCAA") plan, which both limited the number
of television appearances for its member schools and forbade them
from selling any television rights outside the scope of the plan,
violated the Sherman Act.'°9 In effect, the NCAA plan established
a minimum aggregate price which precluded the member schools
from negotiating their own television deals."° The Court concluded
that the NCAA's procompetitive interest in maintaining a compet-
itive balance among college football teams did not outweigh the
anticompetitive effects of the plan.'" Thus, by balancing the re-
straints against the benefits, the Court rejected an application of
the per se rule." 2
One commentator has noted the significance of the NCAA
Court's refusal to apply the per se rule." 3 Because the NCAA plan
precluded the member schools from negotiating their own deals,
and given that the member schools compete with one another, the
NCAA Court concluded that this restriction constituted horizontal
166
 Maricopa County, 457 U.S. at 344 n.16 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977)); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106 457 U.S. at 360 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 363-64 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted: "It is settled law that once
an arrangement has been labeled as 'price fixing' it is to be condemned per 3e. But it is equally
well settled that this characterization is not to be applied as a talisman to every arrangement
that involves a literal fixing of prices." Id. at 361-62 (Powell, J., dissenting).
' 33 See CARLA A. finis, ANTITRUST ADVISER § 1.09, at 14 n.89, 14-16 (3d ed. 1985);
Richmond, supra note 29, at 288.
I" 468 U.S. 85, 94, 120 (1984).
110 1d. at 99-100.
" 1 Id. at 117.
112 See id. at 100-01.
115 See KurrNEtt, supra note 29, 8.3, at 32 (Supp. 1992).
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price-fixing. 114 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, recognized
that the probability of a horizontal price-fixing arrangement being
anticompetitive is so strong that it would, under ordinary circum-
stances, be ruled illegal per se." 5
NCAA presented circumstances, however, such that the Court
found application of the per se rule to be inappropriate." 6 The
Court observed that the NCAA was a nonprofit organization, and
that the NCAA had played a role in fostering intercollegiate athletic
competition for many years.'" Nevertheless, these factors were not
sufficient for the Court to abandon the per se rule."B Rather, the
Court noted that horizontal restraints are required in the college
football industry if there is to exist a college football "product," and
that, for this reason, it should not apply the per se rule." 9 Analysis
under a different standard, the Court therefore noted, was required
to properly judge the anticompetitive nature of the NCAA
The Court concluded that the ultimate criterion for proper analysis
of alleged Sherman Act violations is the questioned activity's impact
on competition. 12 '
Commentators have had difficulty interpreting the NCAA de-
cision. 122 One commentator has suggested that the NCAA decision
restricts the application of the per se rule by instead applying the
rule of reason to certain horizontal price-fixing arrangements.'"
This commentator further notes that the standard enunciated in
NCAA differs from the rule of reason standard because it does not
refer to market efficiency or other policy justifications, but permits
further inquiry only if the availability of the "product" is in jeop-
ardy.'" In that sense, the commentator contends that the NCAA
approach is an application of the rule of reason in narrow circum-
stances that traditionally would call for per se rule application.' 25
114 468 U.S. at 99-100.
110 Id. at 87, 100.
110 Id. at 100.
"7 Id. at 100-01.
Its Id.
112 Id. at 100-01.
1 " See id. at 103.
' 21 1d. at 104.
'" See KINTNER, supra note 29, 8.3, at 32 n.105a (Supp. 1992); Kreisler, supra note 1,
at 227-28; Richmond, supra note 29, at 293-94.
120 See Richmond, supra note 29, at 294.
144 See id.
1114 See id. at 295. For the purposes of this note, therefore, the NCAA approach will be
considered a third mode of interpretation in the Supreme Court's analytical framework for
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Although NCAA can be interpreted as an attempt to bridge the
gap between Broadcast Music and Maricopa County, one commentator
has suggested that its effect on modern antitrust doctrine remains
uncertain.' 26 This commentator notes that although it is settled that
many horizontal price-fixing arrangements will be subject to eval-
uation under the per se rule, it is not clear exactly which ones.'"
The Court has, however, established the following elements for
consideration: first, a nonprofit entity is not necessarily shielded
from Sherman Act application;' 28
 second, "good motives" alone will
not exempt an activity that would otherwise be considered unlawful
as a Sherman Act violation;' 29 third, Congress is free to amend the
Sherman Act to exclude from its ambit activities that, if challenged
under the current modes of analysis, would be declared unlawful; 13°
and fourth, the ultimate goals of both the per se rule and the rule
of reason are to gauge the competitive effect of the challenged
activity.'s' The difference between the rule of reason and the per
se rule, according to the Broadcast Music Court, lies in the depth of
the necessary inquiry.'" With the previous discussion of the stan-
dards that the Supreme Court uses to weigh alleged antitrust vio-
lations as a background, the following section will recount the cur-
rent Justice Department antitrust investigation of financial aid
information-sharing and discuss the present status of both the gov-
ernment's suit against MIT and the Kingsepp class action.
II. THE OVERLAP GROUP, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
INVESTIGATION AND PENDING LITIGATION
A. The Overlap Group and the Concept of Need-Based Financial Aid
Analysis
On May 2, 1989, The Wall Street Journal ("Journal") reported
that the financial aid officers of twenty-three colleges and univer-
antitrust cases. Cf. Kreisler, supra note I, at 227 (NCAA represents a "qualified per se"
analysis); Richmond, supra note 29, at 295 (NCAA represents an "enhanced per se" analysis).
1" See Richmond, supra note 29, at 288, 295-96.
129
 Id. at 295-96.
'Ye
	 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). See supra text accom-
panying notes 46-52 for a discussion of Goldfarb.
129
 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23 (1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 109-21 for a discussion of NCAA.
"s° Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982). See supra
text accompanying notes 71-76 for a discussion of Maricopa County.
'" NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103.
152 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979). See supra text accompanying
notes 93-100 for a discussion of Broadcast Music.
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sities in the Northeast convened annually each spring in a group
known as the Overlap Group.'" The article is considered to have
provided the impetus for the Justice Department's investigation.' 34
The Overlap Group, however, was not a recent phenomenon.'" It
had been organized in the 1950s as an effort to devote financial aid
resources to students who could demonstrate need rather than
spending those resources on students of tremendous academic or
athletic caliber.'" The Journal questioned, however, whether these
meetings constituted collusion.'"
At their meetings, the members of the Overlap Group broke
down into two contingent's: the "Ivy Overlap Group" comprised of
the eight Ivy League schools and MIT; and the "Pentagonal/Sisters
Group" comprised of the remaining fourteen schools.'" The Jour-
nal reported that the financial aid officers at the meeting would
share financial data on financial aid applicants that had been ad-
mitted to more than one of the schools.' 39 The result of this infor-
mation exchange, the Journal stated, was uniform financial aid of-
," Gary Putka, Do Colleges Collude on Financial Aid?, WALL Sr. J., May 2, 1989, at Bl.
134 David Johnston, Top Colleges' Scholarships Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1989,
at Al.
I" See Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 1.
136 1d. at 1. This need to democratize and make the financial aid process consistent led
to the Formation in 1954 of the College Scholarship Service, which, through its standardized
forms, now provides certain financial information about all students applying for financial
aid to approximately 1,800 member schools. Id. at 2. The student authorizes the College
Scholarship Service to release the relevant information to the schools to which the student
applied. These forms allow the College Scholarship Service to conduct need-based analysis
with two primary goals: determining the amount of money a student and the student's family
are capable of contributing to education costs; and assuring that similarly situated students
in terms of financial need receive similar amounts of aid. Oakley, supra note 14, at 4. The
formulas used to make these determinations include variables such as income, savings, debt,
pension plans, other family education obligations and extraordinary circumstances. See id.
The ultimate award may take the Form of a direct grant, a loan or a job on campus. Durkee
& Berek, supra note 2, at 4. Grants and loans provided through financial aid may come from
the college directly, a state program or the federal government. College Scholarship Service,
Financial Aid Form: School Year 1992-93, at I. The primary federal financial aid programs
are called Pell Grants, Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants, College Work-Study,
Perkins Loans and Stafford Loans. Id.
,s7 See Putka, supra note 133, at Bl. The article describes the Overlap Group as "a price-
fixing system that OPEC might envy." Id.
13" Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a list of all the colleges and universities
represented in the Overlap Group.
's" See Putka, supra note 133, at Bl. The typical practice among the member schools of
the Overlap Group is to make a determination on an applicant's admission status before
considering the applicant's financial need. See Goldsmith, supra note 14, at 22; Oakley, supra
note 14, at 3. Smith College, however, announced in 1990 that this would no longer be its
policy. Campus Life: Smith: Ability To Pay Becomes Factor in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1990,
at 4 1, part 2, at 51.
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fers.' 4° The author of the Journal article hypothesized a scenario
where two Ivy League schools would share their data on a high
school student admitted to both institutions.' 91
 In the example, one
of the schools had preliminarily determined that the student's fam-
ily was able to contribute $6,000; the other school had reached a
figure of $7,000. 142
 After sharing information, according to this
example; both schools agreed that the student could contribute
$7,000, thereby depriving the student of the $1,000 savings other-
wise obtainable at one school.'"
The schools characterize the mission of the Overlap Group
quite differently. 144
 First, they note that the existence of the Overlap
Group and its activities have been publicized regularly over the
years and that its meetings have not been secret.'" Second, the
sharing of financial information, they argue, fills in knowledge gaps
resulting from the incomplete provision of information to some
schools. 146
 These exchanges could also result in a school raising its
preliminary award if information obtained at the meeting demon-
strated that a student's need was greater than previously esti-
mated."' Third, the schools argue that the need-based evaluations
undertaken by the Overlap Group are mandated by federal policy
espoused in the congressional methodology that applies to schools
awarding federal financial assistance. 148 Moreover, the schools con-
tend that the meetings allow the schools' financial aid officers to
discuss possible ways of determining realistic family contribution
amounts in situations not covered by the congressional methodol-
ogy, including the value of non-cash benefits and contributions of
I4G See Putka, supra note 133, at Bl.
"I Id.
142 Id.
143 id.
'" Set generally Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 3-4; Oakley, supra note 14, at 4-5.
145 See Vobejda, supra note 18, at AS.
146 See Putka, supra note 4, at 135.
' 47 Id.
"a Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 3; see also Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C.
§11 1087dd(b)(1), 1091(b) (1989). Federal law provides the mechanism by which institutions
of higher education must award various federal grants and loans administered by the schools.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1087kk-vv (1989 & Supp. II 1990); Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 3. This
mechanism is referred to as the congressional methodology. See Durkee & Berek, supra note
2, at 3. Its calculations are based upon the cost of attendance and a determined family
contribution that is subtracted from the cost of attendance to determine a student's need. 20
U.S.C. § 108711-mm (1989) (aid award calculus). The formulas for determining the family
contribution are based upon the income level and asset holdings of parents and students and
are also mandated by law. See generally 20 U.S.C. f 1087nn-vv (1989 & Supp. II 1990).
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non-custodial parents.' 49 Fourth, the schools argue that need-based
awards increase the diversity of the student body by maximizing
the benefit to all concerned through an equitable cash allocation.LS"
Finally, it has been argued that the Overlap Group's exchange of
information was only an exchange, with the individual schools mak-
ing the final financial aid awards.' 51
B. The Justice Department Investigation
In August of 1989, several Overlap Group members and other
prestigious colleges and universities acknowledged that they were
under investigation by the justice Department for potential federal
antitrust law violations in connection with such information-sharing
meetings.' 52 The schools became aware of the investigation in the
summer of 1989 when they received documents from the Justice
Department called civil investigative demands ("CIDs").'" The jus-
19 Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 3.
/d. at 4-5.
351 Id. at 4. Irving Scher, in his post as head of the American Bar Association's antitrust
section, stated that the mere exchange of information is not necessarily illegal unless accom-
panied by evidence of uniform price-sewing. Barrett & Chipello, supra note 3, at B2.
In See generally Vobejda, supra note 18, at A3. See supra note II for a list of the schools
acknowledging their roles in the investigation. Both an article in the Journal regarding the
financial aid meetings and spiraling tuition rates probably aroused the suspicion of the Justice
Department. See Gary Putka, Elite Private Colleges Routinely Share Plans for Raising Tuition,
WALL Sr. J., Sept. 5, 1989, at Al (tuition rates); Johnston, supra note 134, at AI (Journal
article instigates probe). A "confidential" document regarding tuition prices drafted by the
Office of the Treasurer of Wesleyan University and released on March 4, 1988 drew special
attention. See Putka, supra, at Al. Wesleyan made the document public to assist in countering
the outcry that followed the school's announcement of a 7.5% increase in total student charges
for the 1988-89 school year. See id. The document showed that Wesleyan's planned increase
fell within the spectrum of planned cost increases at other prestigious northeastern schools
by listing the percentage hikes that the other schools would undertake. Id. What aroused the
greatest suspicion, however, was that most of the schools referred to had not yet announced
their cost increases for the following school year. Id. Wesleyan did not disclose how it had
acquired this information, and this lack of disclosure fueled the debate that had been growing
over escalating tuition costs at private colleges and universities across the United States. See
id. Between the 1971-72 school year and the 1989-90 school year, tuition at private four-
year schools had risen fivefold. Paul M. Barrett, U.S. Charges 8 Ivy League Universities and
MIT with Fixing Financial Aid, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1991, at A16. Over the same time span,
however, the consumer price index had only increased threefold. Id. Additionally, in Decem-
ber, 1988, President George Bush held a meeting with ten college presidents at which former
White House Chief of Staff John Sununu—with two of his eight children attending college
at the time—lectured the college presidents for what he believed to be excessive tuition
increases. Putka, supra, at A 1 .
Vobejda, supra note 18, at A3. A CID is a noncriminal inquiry that mandates the
production of documents or other information relevant to an investigation. Understanding the
Antitrust Investigation, supra note 9, at 18-19.
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tice Department requested that the schools produce memoranda,
documented expense accounts, travel vouchers, telephone logs of
certain employees and other background papers relating to the
setting of financial aid awards.' 54 The administrative costs of com-
plying with these requests grew to be large.' 55 For example, Dart-
mouth College alone spent $400,000 and submitted 20,000 pages
of documents to the Justice Department to comply fully with the
CID. 156 The high compliance costs led schools to complain in the
media about the random, undefined nature of the Justice Depart-
ment's requests.' 57
The central allegations arising from this investigation were that
the Overlap Group, in violation of the Sherman Act, shared finan-
cial data on students with the intent of eliminating significant dif-
ferences among preliminary awards.' 58 As a result of this process,
the Justice Department further alleged that individual family con-
tributions would be similar at each of a student's potential schools
of matriculation.' 59 The Justice Department has implicitly asserted
that these determinations should be based on "merit," defined as
academic achievement, talent or contribution to diversity. 160
In an attempt to cooperate with the investigation, the Overlap
Group announced in March 1991 that it would not meet that year
as a gesture of "good faith." 81 Later that month, the Overlap Group
made a proposal offering to stop all allegedly collusive activity in
exchange for the Justice Department's agreement to end the inves-
154 Understanding the Antitrust Investigation, supra note 9, at 18-19; Vobejda, supra note 18,
at A3. The Justice Department also requested information pertaining to the setting of tuition
and faculty salaries. Understanding the Antitrust Investigation, supra note 9, at 18-19. The Justice
Department did not allege illegal sharing of these types of information in its lawsuit, however,
and a full discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of this note. See generally Plaintiff's
Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C. I, Sherman Antitrust Act at 5-
6, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—C1V-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1991) (tuition
and faculty salary setting not alleged).
' 55
 Mashek & Flint, supra note. 4, at 38.
155 Id. Following its recent receipt of notification that it is no longer under investigation,
Ohio Wesleyan University President David L. Warren stated that compliance had cost that
school approximately $200,000, an amount that he said is enough to increase tuition. Scott
Jaschik, Justice Department Ends Its Antitrust Inquiry at 19 Colleges; Their Leaders Express Relief,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 29, 1992, at A27. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the recent end of the Justice Department's inquiry concerning twenty-five
of the colleges and universities.
1 " Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38.
' 55 Plaintiff's Complaint at 5-6, Brown Univ., No. 91—CI V-3274.
1591d, at 6.
165 See id. at 5.
161 Putka, supra note 4, at BI.
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tigation.' 62 The government rejected this proposal, which led some
experts to speculate that it had a strong case and was unwilling to
settle for a mere prospective agreement to disband the Overlap
Group. ' 63
In fact, the Justice Department did formally file civil charges
against the nine members of the "Ivy Overlap Group" on May 22,
1991, requesting equitable relief in the form of a ten-year injunction
against such meetings and the mandatory creation of a comprehen-
sive program to assure the schools' compliance.' 64 Nevertheless, this
civil suit was filed in conjunction with a consent decree formally
settling the dispute concerning the eight Ivy League schools.' 65 The
consent decree effected a type of "immediate settlement" under
which the schools, despite agreeing to refrain in the future from
such meetings or financial aid information exchanges, denied all
liability in exchange for the government's agreement to dismiss the
suit.' 66 The consent decree does not bar the schools from appealing
to Congress, however, and officials from at least two of the Ivy
League schools have stated publicly that they will pursue a legislative
solution to the issue.' 67 The schools view the Justice Department's
162 Gary Putka & Paul M. Barrett, Justice Department Spurns a Proposal by Colleges to Settle
Antitrust Inquiry, WALL Si. J., Mar. 21, 1991, at A3. Barnard College and Yale University
withdrew from the Overlap Group in 1990. Putka, supra note 4, at 131.
163 Putka & Barrett, supra note 162, at A3.
164 Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C. 	 1, Sherman
Antitrust Act at 9-10, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—C1V-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May
22, 1991). The members of the Ivy Overlap Group were Brown University, Columbia Uni-
versity, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, MIT, Princeton Univer-
sity, the University of Pennsylvania and Yale University. See Putka, supra note 133, at RI.
165 See United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at 1 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1991)
(order approving consent decree).
166 See Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at 1-2, 4-5 (order approving consent decree);
Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38. The schools also agreed not to exchange information
regarding tuition and faculty salaries, although these activities were not alleged in the gov-
ernment's complaint. Barrett, supra note 152, at A16.
167 Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at 10 (order approving consent decree); DePalma,
supra note 9, at A 12 (Columbia University); Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38 (Yale
University). In fact, the Senate recently passed legislation reauthorizing the Higher Education
Act for the next seven years. S. 1150, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also Thomas J.
DeLoughry, Senate Approves Massive Legislation for Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER Enoc.,
Mar. 4, 1992, at A27. Certain provisions of this legislation discuss the authority of colleges
and universities to award need-based aid. S. 1150, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. ti 499C (1992). The
Senate version of the bill provides that schools may agree with other schools to award financial
aid only on the basis of demonstrated need, provided that the formulas applied are adopted
unilaterally. Id. 499C(a)(1). The bill also provides that schools may continue to collect data
from processors of financial aid information provided that they collect data only on their
applicants and do not obtain the names of other schools to which the applicants have applied.
Id. § 499C(a)(3). The bill specifically states that except for the allowance for agreements to
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action as a threat to American public education policy because they
contend that need-based analysis promotes diversity and the ideal
of making education available to all students, regardless of wealth.' 68
C. Pending Litigation
MIT did not join the consent decree, and the school remains a
defendant in the government's civil lawsuit.' 69 Officials at MIT
stated publicly at the time that the decision not to take part in the
settlement was based on their firm belief that Overlap Group meet-
ings did not violate federal antitrust law.'" With the lawsuit con-
tinuing against MIT, therefore, the school filed its answer to the
government's complaint on July 8, 1991. 171 It admitted that it had
belonged to the Overlap Group since 1958 and that it had agreed
with the other original defendants to award financial aid solely upon
the basis of need.'" It denied, however, that the members of the
Overlap Group use an agreed-upon uniform formula to determine
an applicant's financial aid award.'" In fact, MIT asserted as affir-
mative defenses that the challenged activities did not constitute
business competition as contemplated by the Sherman Act, and that,
on the contrary, its dedication to providing financial aid based upon
need is both consistent with and required by federal law.'"
Following the publicity surrounding the acknowledged receipt
of CIDs by members of the Overlap Group and other institutions,
a Wesleyan student filed a separate lawsuit against the Ivy League
schools, Stanford University, Amherst College, Wesleyan University
and Williams College.'" Roger Kingsepp filed the lawsuit in federal
award need-based aid discussed above, nothing in the bill precludes the application of
antitrust laws to colleges and universities. Id. * 499C(b). Moreover, nothing in the bill affects
the terms of the consent decree entered into by the Ivy League schools. See id. The House
of Representatives is considering a similar version of the bill. DeLoughry, supra, at A27, A30.
I" Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 4-5; Oakley, supra note 14, at 5.
IM Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38.
I" See DePalma, supra note 9, at Al2.
11 Paul E. Gray, Measure Need, Not Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at A15. The
government's lawsuit was scheduled to go to trial on June 25, 1992. United States v. Brown
Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 at I (E.D. Pa. filed April 24, 1992) (order setting trial date).
172 Answer of Defendant Massachusetts Institute of Technology at 6, United States v.
Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed July 8, 1991).
123 Id. (referring to Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1, Sherman Antitrust Act at 6, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274 (E.D. Pa.
filed May 22, 1991)).
174 See id, at 8.
"3 Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., No. 89—C1V-6121 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Sept. 15, 1989); Francis Oakley, supra note 14, at 1-2.
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court in New York on September 15, 1989, alleging that the defen-
dant colleges and universities had conspired to fix or inflate the
price of tuition and financial aid.' 76 In the complaint, the allegedly
injured students are labeled "higher education shoppers." 177 Cur-
rently, the lawsuit is seeking class certification and is pending trial
in the Southern District of New York.'"
Kingsepp brought the lawsuit on behalf of himself and "all
others similarly situated," a number that could exceed 150,000.'"
Potential plaintiffs in the class include present and former students
at the colleges and universities that are defendants in this lawsuit.'"
The complaint requests total damages consisting of actual and com-
pensatory damages, treble damages and a permanent injunction
prohibiting tuition and financial aid collusion in the future. 18 '
Pending the lawsuit, it remains unclear what, if any, impact the
consent decree in the Justice Department's action will have on this
lawsuit.'" The consent decree's language specifies that it will "nei-
ther impair nor assist" related private litigation.'" Moreover, fed-
eral law provides that consent decrees rendered before a court hears
evidence shall not be used against a defendant in another action
brought by a third party.'" Nevertheless, Steven Kramer, the attor-
ney representing Kingsepp, has suggested that the cancellation of
1991's Overlap Group meeting should be construed as a recognition
that the schools were engaging in an illegal practice.'"
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE OVERLAP GROUP'S ACTIVITIES WITHIN
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE SHERMAN ACT
To analyze the respective positions of the Justice Department
and the Overlap Group, it is necessary to determine the competitive
178 Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, 2, Kingsepp, No. 89—CIV-6121.
ITT
	 at 3.
See id. at 1; Barrett, supra note 152, at A16.
178 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 5, King-
sepp v. Wesleyan Univ., No. 89—CIV-6121 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 27, 1989); Plaintiff's Com-
plaint at 1, Kingsepp, No. 89—CIV-6121.
188 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 1, Kingsepp,
No. 89—CIV-6121.
181
 Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Kingsepp, No. 89—C1V-6121.
182 Mashek & Flint, supra note 4, at 38. The eight Ivy League schools were originally
named as defendants in both actions. Plaintiff's Complaint for Equitable Relief for Violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 1, Sherman Antitrust Act at I, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 9I—C1V-
3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1991); Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, Kingsepp, No. 89—C1V-6121.
188 Barrett, supra note 152, at A16.
184 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1989).
'" See Putka, supra note 4, at B5.
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effect of the schools' practices.'" Although it was successfully ar-
gued in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association
of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc. that the Sherman Act was not
intended to apply to nonprofit organizations or institutions of learn-
ing, the Supreme Court has since broadened the scope of the Sher-
man Act to include the activities of nonprofit organizations.' 87 Thus,
that argument alone is unlikely to protect the schools.' 88
Assuming the Sherman Act applies, the courts will have to
decide which standard should be applied to the situation. As dis-
cussed in section I of this note, the threshold inquiry must be
whether the Overlap Group's meetings constituted a horizontal
price-fixing arrangement that was plainly anticompetitive such that
the per se rule is applicable, or whether further inquiry under the
rule of reason is necessary. 189 As noted previously, horizontal price-
fixing occurs when similarly situated parties that compete in the
distribution of a service or good make agreements that eliminate
price as an element of that competition.'" Taken in that context,
the practices of the Overlap Group appear suspect. The private
colleges and universities are competitors to the extent that they
compete for the most qualified high school graduates.' 8 ' It is rea-
sonable, further, to regard the schools' provision of higher educa-
tion as the distribution of a product.' 82 Therefore, if it can be shown
that the alleged standardization of financial aid awards constitutes
an agreement to fix prices, a court may presume that the schools
were engaged in horizontal price-fixing.' 83
"6 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
187 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100, 120 (nonprofit association held in violation of Sherman
Act). But see Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940) ("business compe-
tition" was the problem contemplated by the statute); Marjorie Webster junior College, Inc.
v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schs., Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (proscriptions of Sherman Act designed for business world rather than for noncom-
mercial applications in the liberal arts or learned professions), cm. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
168 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 339, 357 (1982) (society
of physicians held in violation of Sherman Act despite the society's nonprofit status).
189 See supra notes 28-132 and accompanying text For a discussion of judicial interpre-
tations of the Sherman Act.
19° See supra note 54 for a discussion of horizontal price-fixing.
' 91 See Richmond, supra note 29, at 276.
1" Id.
"3 See id. While financial aid awards and tuition are understandably intertwined concepts
from the perspective of a high school student, the processes by which they are determined
are discrete within the schools. See generally Oakley, supra note 14, at 3. The justice Depart-
ment did not include in its civil action against the members of the Ivy Overlap Group any
allegations pertaining to either tuition price-fixing or faculty salary-fixing. See Plaintiff's
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The allegations in the government's lawsuit against MIT do
not fit clearly into any one mode of analysis nor are they capable
of simple resolution. It is uncontested that the members of the
Overlap Group exchanged information for the purpose of awarding
financial aid based on need rather than "merit" as defined by the
Justice Department.'" The federal courts hearing the Kingsepp case
and the Justice Department's action will still have to decide, how-
ever, whether the Overlap Group members used an agreed-upon,
uniform formula to standardize the award that an applicant admit-
ted to more than one of the schools would receive.'" MIT has
denied this allegation.'" Other schools have also suggested that
although the meetings were for the purpose of sharing data, the
individual schools' officials independently made the ultimate deter-
minations. 197
Even if the Overlap Group did make use of a uniform formula,
it remains to be determined whether the practice of sharing infor-
mation constitutes plainly anticompetitive price-fixing that warrants
application of the per se rule.'" To make this determination, a
court must decide whether a financial aid award constitutes a "price"
within the contemplation of federal antitrust law. While the financial
aid award alone is not the price a student will pay for an education,
it can be viewed as the discount from that price. Therefore, because
it has a direct and easily calculated effect on the price, the financial
Complaint for Equitable Relief For Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1, Sherman Antitrust Act at 5-
6, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—C1V-3274 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22, 1991). Why this
omission existed given the scope of inquiry contained in the CIDs is not clear. Barrett, supra
note 152, at A16. Nevertheless, the consent decree included a promise by the schools to
refrain from such actions in the future and the topic has stirred interest in the press. See id.;
DePalma, supra note 9, at Al.
.1n general, a college education at a private institution has become an extremely expensive
undertaking in the past twenty years. See Barrett, supra note 152, at A16. Once higher
education is deemed a product, there can be no more accurate representation of its "price"
than tuition, even though it may represent a portion of a college's determination of the cost
of that education, the remainder being offset by endowments or annual pledge drives. Cf.
Oakley, supra note 14, at 2-3. Other elements of the total price of a college education,
however, may include room and board and other fees. See Answer of Defendant Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology at 5, United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—C1V-3274 (E.D. Pa.
filed July 8, 1991).
194 Answer of Defendant Massachusetts Institute of Technology at 6, Brown Univ., No.
91—CIV-3274; Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274.
195 See Answer of Defendant Massachusetts Institute of Technology at 6, Brown Univ.,
No. 91—CIV-3274; Plaintiff's Complaint at 5, Brown Univ., No. 91—CIV-3274.
ig6 Answer of Defendant Massachusetts Institute of Technology at 6, Brown Univ., No.
91—CIV-3274.
197 See Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 4.
198 See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the per se rule.
788	 BOSTON COI I ROE LAW REVIEW	 {Vol. 33:763
aid award would probably be considered a price for the purposes
of Sherman Act analysis.
It is not clear that the information exchange constitutes the
fixing of that price, however. First, the schools may not be "locked
in" to a price determination calculated at the meeting, and if any
individual school so desired, it would be free to increase or decrease
its award.'" Second, the concept of information exchange has be-
come commonplace through the 1,800-member College Scholarship
Service and the data it provides. 200 In terms of the competitive effect
of the challenged activity, the information exchange is analogous to
that in Board of Trade v. United States, where a rule setting the price
of certain grain contracts affected only a small portion of the market
and had several beneficial market effects. 20 ' First, the schools' prac-
tice affects only a portion of the market because a student is free
to attend another school that did not take part in such an infor-
mation exchange. Second, the schools defend the practice with
public policy arguments grounded in federal law requirements that
they conduct need-based analysis in awarding federal financial aid
to students." 2 Because the per se rule applies only when the chal-
lenged activity is a blatant example of horizontal price-fixing, these
two justifications would probably lead a court to decline to apply
the per se rule.203
Thus, because application of the per se rule would be problem-
atic, a court would probably analyze financial aid information-shar-
ing by applying the rule of reason standard. 2D4 In Board of Trade,
Justice Brandeis noted that every agreement restrains trade to some
degree.206 The purpose of the rule of reason standard is to discover
if the restraint is an unreasonable suppression of competition, or if
it is either a mere check on competition or even a competition-
promoting device.206 Thus, it is appropriate for a court to consider
199 See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the Overlap
Group's meetings operated.
2® See Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 2. See supra note 136 for a discussion of the
College Scholarship Service.
"' See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,240-41 (1918).
2°2 See supra note 147 for a discussion of federal law requirements.
"See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the per se rule. See
also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1,19-20 (1979) (per se rule to be applied only
when challenged activity "facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output").
2°4 See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the per se rule;
notes 82-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rule of reason.
205 Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918).
20°1d.
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facts peculiar to the business, the nature of the restraint, the effect
of the restraint, the history of the restraint, the evil the restraint
was designed to alleviate, the reason for the particular method
chosen and the restraint's purpose. 2°7 In Broadcast Music, the Su-
preme Court more recently confirmed that application of the rule
of reason is appropriate unless the arrangement is plainly anticom-
petitive and lacks any redeeming virtue.'" Given the schools' ar-
guments concerning the purpose of the Overlap Group meetings,
their actual mechanics and the beneficial effects of need-based anal-
ysis, a court will almost certainly evaluate this issue according to the
rule of reason standard.'"
If the schools' assertion that the meetings were simply an ex-
change of information with no concomitant standardizing of the
financial aid awards is true, then the inquiry is probably complete
and no violation has occurred. Considering the justifications for
ensuring that schools have complete financial information, the prac-
tice may be viewed as merely a supplement to the College Schol-
arship Service. If the awards then are actually determined on an
individual basis, any restraint on trade would be too remote and
conjectural for condemnation under the Sherman Act.
The question becomes more difficult, however, if the Justice
Department's allegation that the schools use an agreed-upon for-
mula to standardize the awards following the exchange of infor-
mation is true."' Viewed in isolation, the practice appears to be a
traditional antitrust violation: competitors conspiring to remove
price as an element of consideration for consumers in making their
choice as to whose product is best for them. As Board of Trade
suggests, however, the situation cannot be viewed in isolation.'"
The meetings of the Overlap Group must be viewed in the context
of their history, purpose and effect. Only then can it be fairly
determined whether the meetings are an unreasonable restraint of
trade.
Solid arguments exist on both sides of the issue. The consis-
tency of the Overlap Group's practices with federally mandated
207 Id.
08 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979).
209 See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the schools' per-
spective on the Overlap Group meetings.
21° See supra text accompanying notes 158-60 for a discussion of the justice Department's
allegations.
2" See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.").
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need-based analysis for the disbursement of federal funds will likely
influence a court toward the schools' position, however. 212 The
schools have argued that the Overlap Group has existed for over
thirty-five years and that they have publicized its existence and
purpose. 213 The schools have also suggested that the exchange of
information is simply an effort to fill in gaps in knowledge. 214
 While
these facts demonstrate the good intentions of the schools, they do
little to shield them from the Sherman Act. 215
A primary defense of the Overlap Group has been that,
through need-based analysis, it seeks to promote diversity on college
campuses by maximizing the benefit to all financial aid applicants
through a proper and informed allocation of limited resources. 216
This argument, however, will not excuse a violation of the Sherman
Act because "good motives" by themselves will not protect a chal-
lenged activity from federal antitrust law. 2 " Encouraging diversity
has become an extremely important priority to most colleges and
universities in this country, but promoting such goals in this context
may require congressional authority. 218
The schools have noted, however, that need-based evaluation
is mandated by the federal policy espoused in the congressional
methodology that applies to schools awarding federal financial
aid."° They argue that the Overlap Group meetings both fulfill this
obligation and further the goal by providing a forum in which to
discuss financial questions not covered by the congressional meth-
odology. 22° This is a persuasive argument for three reasons. First,
because colleges and universities conduct need-based analysis as a
matter of course in awarding federal aid money, it is simple to use
the same analysis in determining their own aid packages. Second,
information-sharing already takes place on a much wider scale than
the Overlap Group through the College Scholarship Service. Third,
2" See supra note 148 for a discussion of the federal law applicable to the disbursement
of federal loans and grants.
213 See supra text accompanying note 145.
2" See supra text accompanying note 146.
213 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 101 n.23
(1989) ("[G]ood motives will not validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice.").
216 See supra text accompanying note 150.
2" See NCAA, 968 U.S. at 101 n.23 (1984).
2" See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of both the policy
implications of a finding that the Overlap meetings constituted a violation of the Sherman
Act and the potential for legislative intervention.
219 See supra note 148 for a discussion of the congressional methodology.
220 See supra text accompanying note 149.
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the federal law mandate of need-based analysis for determining
financial need with respect to federal financial aid indicates federal
support for the need-based analysis mechanism in general.
The first argument is one of economic efficiency. As noted
above, different colleges and universities may be given different
financial information on the same students. 22 ' This,may result from
different financial questions posed or from different deadlines.
Information-sharing therefore supplements the need determina-
tion because schools with outdated or incomplete data can form a
more accurate assessment of the student's potential family contri-
bution. Because need-based analysis is required for disbursement
of federal money and because most schools make determinations
based on need for the disbursement of their own funds as well, they
can do so most efficiently if they base both sets of aid on the same
analysis. 222 To attempt to conduct need-based analysis for federal
aid and merit-based analysis for school aid would be redundant and
probably ultimately a fictional distinction.
Second, since the 1950s, most colleges and universities have
obtained their primaryfinancial data on students through the Col-
lege Scholarship Service's standardized forms. 223 The Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965 was passed after the College Scholarship Service
was formed in 1954.224 In effect, then, the information that schools
initially use to compute the congressional methodology formulas is
information that any number of the 1,800 member schools in the
College Scholarship Service could share. 225 Because certain schools
supplement the information gathered by the College Scholarship
Service with their own financial aid forms, associations such as the
Overlap Group merely provide a second level of information ex-
change. The Overlap Group should not be singled out because it is
smaller and comprised of what are considered "elite" or "presti-
gious" schools.
Third, the policy behind granting financial aid based upon
need rather than merit is to make a college education, even at a
private school, affordable to more students so that students are not
22L See supra text accompanying note 146.
222 See supra note 136 for a discussion of how colleges and universities allocate financial
aid resources.
225 See supra note 136 for a discussion of the College Scholarship Service.
224 Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. § 1070 (1989); see also Durkee & Berek,
supra note 2, at 2 (College Scholarship Service formation date).
225 See supra note 136 for a discussion of the size of the College Scholarship Service's
subscription base.
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denied an education at the school of their choice for monetary
reasons.228
 The provisions of the Higher Education Act discussed
in section II of this note reflect the policy that need-based analysis
is also the appropriate method for determining federal financial aid
awards. 227
 Thus, the information exchange conducted by the Over-
lap Group in furtherance of more accurate need-based analysis is
entirely consistent with this policy and should be viewed favorably
by the courts. 228
A court that applies the rule of reason standard should find
that the Overlap meetings were not an unreasonable restraint of
trade considering the federal requirement of need-based analysis
regarding federal funds, the Overlap Group's goal of furthering
the policy underlying need-based analysis and the precedent for
information-sharing set by the College Scholarship Service. These
arguments are further supported by the nonprofit status of the
schools, the public nature of the meetings and the socially progres-
sive ends sought to be attained. Although it is true that none of
these arguments alone would shield the schools from Sherman Act
application, they are relevant when considered in conjunction with
the federal policy underpinnings outlined above. 229
Finally, the issue could also be analyzed using the NCAA ap-
proach.23° Although at least one commentator found the NCAA
Court's analysis confusing, it may apply to the Overlap Group's
practice of sharing information.23 ' The NCAA Court noted that it
did not apply the per se rule because horizontal restraints were
necessary to ensure the continued availability of the college football
product. 232 Likewise, to the extent that the NCAA approach is an
exception to the per se rule, a court considering whether to. apply
the per se rule to allegations of financial aid price-fixing might find
the NCAA approach preferable because resources for financial aid
are finite and their continued availability is therefore in question. 233
For the less wealthy schools under investigation, dollars spent in
2" See Oakley, supra note 14, at 5.
447 See supra note 148 for a discussion of the required analysis under federal law.
228 Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1979) (blanket licensing system
found to be consistent with approach taken by federal copyright law).
. 2" See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (relevant factors to be
considered). See supra note 92 for a list of these factors.
430
	
supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NCAA approach.
231 See Richmond, supra note 29, at 293-94 (NCAA approach is "murky and confused").
4S2 National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984).
233 See supra notes 60-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the per se rule;
notes 110-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the NCAA approach.
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excess of an individual student's need may be dollars that cannot
go to another student. 234 To that extent, higher education may be
unavailable to those who do not receive the financial aid discount
they require to attend. Under the NCAA line of reasoning, there-
fore, the restraint on trade resulting from the information exchange
may not violate the Sherman Act because the exchange is necessary
for the product to be available to a segment of the community that
financial aid is intended to benefit. 235
This argument has some weaknesses, however. First, some
schools may have greater resources than others, such that a dollar
going to one student does not necessarily mean a dollar taken from
another student. Second, only a portion of higher education con-
sumers will be unable to purchase the product, that is, will be unable
to attend the school in question. NCAA only declined to apply the
per se rule because the restraints on individual television contracts
were necessary if the product was to be available at a11. 236
Of the three approaches discussed, then, the rule of reason is
the appropriate standard to apply and, under this standard, the
Overlap Group's practices should be found not to violate the Sher-
man Act. The Overlap Group's practice furthered the policy of
need-based analysis in a manner consistent with federal laws gov-
erning federal financial aid. Whether a court will find that the
colleges and universities have not violated the Sherman Act remains
uncertain, however, given the recent confusion surrounding the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the statute. Therefore, regard-
less of whether a court finds the Overlap meetings to have violated
the Sherman Act, the following section argues for statutory exemp-
tion from the law on policy grounds.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND STATUTORY INTERVENTION
A fair assessment of any challenged activity under the rule of
reason standard will look to the purpose behind the adoption of
the activity. 237 In the case of the Overlap Group, its meetings were
designed in part to allow the schools to construct an accurate picture
of each applicant's financial condition so that an equitable allocation
of financial aid would result. 238 Through an equitable allocation of
234 See Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 5.
2" See 468 U.S. at 101.
236 See id.
2" See Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
2" See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Overlap Group's
purposes.
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cash, the schools aim to diversify by making it possible for more
lower income students to attend. 239 This policy simply fulfills the
schools' "fundamental social responsibility" as nonprofit organiza-
tions to make higher education available to all students, regardless
of wealth. 24°
Without the exchange of financial information, the "bidding
war" scenario would ensue."' Schools would compete for the best
students with increased financial aid packages to the detriment of
other students who would receive less aid. The result would likely
be greater homogeneity at all schools because those requiring the
most aid would be denied the necessary amount at each school. In
other words, the incentive would be for all the schools to offer the
bulk of their financial aid resources to the most qualified candidates.
As discussed earlier, two of the Ivy League schools have sug-
gested appealing to Congress. 242 Clearly this option remains open
to the schools because the consent decree specifically permits pur-
suing a legislative solution. 243 The recently passed Senate bill, which
would reauthorize the Higher Education Act, permits need-based
analysis on an individual basis among colleges and universities, but
does little more than recognize that the issue has become important
as a result of the Justice Department investigation. 244 Although the
bill ostensibly sanctions need-based analysis, it effectively prohibits
information-sharing, which does nothing to prevent the type of
bidding scenario that defeats the very purpose of need-based anal-
ysis. 243
 In fact, the legislation specifically provides that antitrust law
does apply to colleges and universities. 246 Thus, even under this bill,
colleges and universities will still not have access to the complete
financial information necessary to make a knowledgeable judgment
of an individual student's need. The consequences that will result,
including bidding for the best students with financial aid resources
and de-emphasizing diversity goals, will jeopardize the future of
private, liberal arts education in this country.
459 See Durkee & Berek, supra note 2, at 5.
249 See Oakley, supra note 14, at 5.
"I See supra text accompanying note 15.
242
 See supra note 167 and accompanying text for a discussion of suggested legislative
intervention.
245 See United States v. Brown Univ., No. 91—C1V-3274 at 10 (E.D. Pa. filed May 22,
1991) (order approving consent decree).
244
 See supra note 167 for a discussion of the Senate bill's provisions.
415 See S. 1150, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 499C(a)(1) (1992) (reauthorizing the Higher
Education Act).
446 See a § 499C(b).
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Congress needs to address the issue of financial aid informa-
tion-sharing directly. A legislative solution should take the form of
an exemption from the Sherman Act, which would have explicit
statutory precedent in the fields of insurance, export trade and
collective bargaining. 247 Given the mission of American colleges and
universities to provide opportunities for lower income students and
foster campus diversity, Congress should specifically exempt the
sharing of students' financial data by colleges and universities as a
supplement to its own policy of promoting need-based analysis. 248
Although such a move may not be a political priority, Congress
should move educational policy to the forefront of the legislative
agenda. By passing this exemption from the Sherman Act, Congress
thereby ensures for lower income students the continued accessi-
bility of the teaching and resources at some of this country's finest
institutions of higher education.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the economic recession and the high costs of a private
college education, access to financial aid resources has become a
priority for both students and administrators. The information-
sharing practice of the Overlap Group, designed to aid in an eq-
uitable allocation of these resources, does not violate section one of
the Sherman Act. This note has considered the three modes of
interpretation that the Supreme Court has historically used to weigh
activities challenged under the Sherman Act: the per se rule, the
rule of reason and the more recent NCAA approach. The rule of
reason standard is the least stringent of the three. It should be
applied to exonerate the schools in both the Justice Department
lawsuit and the Kingsepp class action. Through this mode of analysis,
a court would discover that information-sharing has been common-
place in the industry through the College Scholarship Service for
over thirty years, and that the Overlap Group has been holding its
meetings publicly over a similar span of time. In addition, the
Overlap meetings were intended merely to supplement financial
242 See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1989) (labor); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1989) (export
trade); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(6) (1989) (insurance). See supra note 75
and accompanying text for a discussion of existing exemptions from the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court has also implicitly exempted all labor disputes in general from the Sherman
Act. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940).
2" See supra text accompanying note 168 for a discussion of the mission of higher
education.
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data so that equitable allocations of financial aid would result. Fi-
nally, the schools' policy of promoting need-based analysis is man-
dated by federal law with respect to federal aid and is entirely
consistent with federal law with respect to an institution's own funds.
A court may not agree with this analysis, however, because the
colleges and universities cannot show actual procompetitive justifi-
cations. Congress should therefore act to specifically exempt from
the Sherman Act information-sharing conducted for the purpose
of facilitating more accurate determinations of students' financial
need. This is entirely consistent with previously existing federal
policy. Moreover, it is clear that the sharing of financial data affir-
matively promotes diversity on campuses and assists in making pri-
vate higher education available to all students regardless of income.
These schools are nonprofit organizations and this is a worthy goal.
It would be inequitable for a statute introduced to alleviate ills
caused by what Senator Sherman himself called the "concentration
of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition" 249 to prevent schools from sharing
data to foster more accurate need-based analysis. In sum, although
no violation of the Sherman Act should be found in either the
Justice Department or the Kingsepp lawsuit, Congress should spe-
cifically address the issue by exempting financial aid information-
sharing from the Sherman Act.
STEPHEN D. BROWNING
"9 21 CONG. REC. 2,455, 2,460 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
